INTRODUCTION
Authentication and confidentiality are two main issues should be carefully considered in the hostile communication enviroment. Authenticated key agreement protocol (AKA protocol), as an important cryptographic primitive, is used to authenticate entities and establish session key between parties via a public communication channel. There are many security attributes that are required for a secure two-party authenticated key agreement protocol [10] [11] [25] :
-Known key secrecy. The disclosure of one session key should not compromise other session keys. This means that the generated session keys are independent among the different protocol runs.
-Forward secrecy. If long-term private keys of one or more of the entities are compromised, the secrecy of previously established session keys should not be affected. Especially, Perfect forward secrecy means that if the long-term keys of all the entities involved may be corrupted without compromising any session key previously established by these entities. No one round (two-pass) two-party implicit authenticated key agreement protocol with no former shared security state could achieve the true perfect forward secrecy, since the adversay could always initiate an active attack by choosing random values by itself and later corrupt one of the parties involed. So we sometimes call it weak perfect forward secrecy [24] .
-PKG forward secrecy. In identity-based systems with Private Key Generator(PKG), the PKG's master key may be corrupted (and hence all users' long-term private keys) without compromising the security of session keys previously established by any users, also known as Master-key forward secrecy. It certainly implies perfect forward secrecy.
-Key compromise impersonation resilience. The compromise of an entity A's long-term private key will allow an adversary to impersonate A, but it should not enable the adversary to impersonate other entities to A.
-Unknown key-share resilience. An entity A should not be able to be coerced into sharing a key with any entity C when in fact entity A thinks that he is sharing the key with another entity B.
-No-key control and Key integrity. Neither entity (even the third party) should be able to force the session key to be a preselected value. Of cource, for the twoparty one round key agreement protocol, it is hard to achieve true No-key control, because one party always initiate the protocol run firstly and choose its random value as the challenge message, and the responsor then has the ability to estimate partial bits of the final session key by choosing the proper values as the response message.
-Known session-specific temporary information secrecy. Some random private information is used as an input of the session key generation function. The exposure of this private temporary information should not compromise the secrecy of generated session keys.
-Message independence. Flows of a protocol run should be unrelated. Of course, this property makes the most sense in the context of an AK protocol. It is not suitable to AK protocols with key confirmation.
The main techniques to design key agreement protocol include traditional public key cryptography [12] , identitybased public key cryptography [13] , and certificateless public key cryptography [14] . Identity-based key agreement protocols from pairings are more popular for its some adventages. So far, great deals of such protocols based on bilinear maps were proposed (e.g. [ [15] ) and most of them have subsequently been broken. One of the first applications of pairing based cryptography was an unauthenticated tripartite key agreement protocol by Joux [16] in 2000. Although it was vulnerable against man-in-the-middle attack, it was a signaficant step in the development of pairing based cryptography.
In 2002, Smart [1] presented the first two-party twopass identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol. It is based on the Weil pairing and combined the ideas of Boneh and Franklin [17] with the tripartite DiffieHellman protocol of Joux [16] . Such a protocol didn't provide perfect forward secrecy [7] and also the known session-key specific temporary information secrecy. Shim [7] suggested a modified version, but it is insecure aginst the man-in-the-middle attack [8] . Chen and Kudla [6] gave two two-pass authenticated key agreement protocols, the first one didn't provide perfect forward secrecy. Nalla and Reddy [18] proposed a tripartite identity-based key agreement scheme, but it was broken laterly. In 2005, McCullagh and Barreto [5] proposed two new efficient two-party identity-based authenticated key agreement protocols in either escrowed or escrowless mode which were inspired on a identity-based key pair derivation algrithm, but they were found vulnerable against key compromise impersonation attack and key replicating attack by Xie [19] , Choo [20] and Cheng et al. [21] .
In 2005, Choie et al. [22] proposed three protocols and declared they were secure with many security attributes. Shim [23] point out that their second protocol with authentication by adapting signature scheme is insecure against signature forgery attack, so it did not provide authentication as intended. Here, we point out that their three schemes are all failured of providing the known session-specific temporary information secrecy attribute, and also, the second scheme is vulnerable to the key replicating attack, the third protocol is vulnerable to the key replicating attack with the forgerable public key of the PKG.
The rest of this paper is organized in the following. Section Ⅱ gives the necessary technical backgrounds. In Section Ⅲ, we briefly review the three authenticated key agreement protocols proposed by Choie et al. We give the security analysis of these three schemes under the BR93 model in Section Ⅳ . At last, we draw the conclusion.
II. TECHNICAL BACKGROUNDS
A. is hard.
C. BR93 Security Model for Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol
The BR93 security model was introduced by Bellare and Rogaway [2] [3], it provides the first formal definition for a model of adversary capabilities with an associated definition of security. The adversary A in the model is a probabilistic machine that controls all the communications that take place between parties by interacting with a set of U in a specific protocol run and 2 U is the principal with whom 1 U wishes to establish a secret key. The predefined oracle queries are described informally as follows. what the protocol specification demands and return to A the response message and/or decision. If has either accepted with some session key or terminated, this will be made known to A .
• 1 2 ( , , )
Reveal U U i Query. It allows A to expose an old session key that has been previously accepted. Upon receiving this query and if it has accepted and holds some session key, U at will, and thereby learn the complete internal state of the corrupted principal. The corrupt query also gives A the ability to overwrite the long-lived key of the corrupted principal with any value of her choice. This query can be used to model the real world scenarios of an insider cooperating with the adversary or an insider who has been completely compromised by the adversary.
• Test U U i query, then depending on a randomly chosen bit b, A is given either the actual session key or a session key drawn randomly from the session key distribution.
In order to define the relationship between two parties involved in the same session, Matching Conversation and Partnership are defined in the BR93 security model. Conversation of an oracle conversations of two oralces are called matching conversation if they achieve the desired conditions, and then the relationship of these two oracles are called partnership. The detailed definitions can be found in [2] . Freshness. The notion is used to identify the session keys about which A ought not to know anything because A has not revealed any oracles that have accepted the key and has not corrupted any principals knowing the key. Oracle Security goal is defined using the game G played between a malicious adversary A and a collection of instances. The adversary A runs the game simulation G , whose setting is as follows.
• Phase 1: A is able to send any , Send Reveal and Corrupt oracle queries at will in the game simulation G .
• Phase 2: At some point during G , A will choose a fresh session on which to be tested and send a Test query to the fresh oracle associated with the test session. Note that the test session chosen must be fresh. Depending on a randomly chosen bit b, A is given either the actual session key or a session key drawn randomly from the session key distribution.
• . A protocol is secure in the BR93 model if both the validity and indistinguishability requirements are satisfied:
• Validity. When the protocol is running between two oracles in the absence of a malicious adversary, the two oracles accept the same session key.
• Indistinguishability. For all probabilistic, polynomial-time (PPT) adversaries A ,
III. REVISIT OF CHOIE ET AL.'S AKA PROTOCOLS
In 2005, Choie et al. [22] proposed three identitybased authenticated key agreement protocols based on bilinear pairing (We denote them CJLprotocols and CJL-1, CJL-2 and CJL-3 protocol seperately). The authors declared that their protocols were secure. We analyzed the proposed protocol in detail. we found that their three schemes are all failured to provide known sessionspecific temporary information secrecy attribute, and also, the second scheme is vulnerable to the key replicating attack, the third protocol is vulnerable to the key replicating attack if the public key of the PKG can be forgerable.
Key replicating attack means that, in the hostile environment fully controled by the adversry, in order to achieve the success of attack, the adversary could modify, inject, and delete messages tansmitted between the two parties who want to agree on the private session key. By properly modified messages, the two parties agreed on the same session key, but it is not the key they really want to agree on. Although in the real world the adversary could not know the session key, it really destroy the integrity of the session key.
Here, we give the brief review of these three protocol. All three protocols are identity-based, this means that a Private Key Generator (PKG) is needed to distribute private keys to the parties who want to establish the secure session key. 
B. CJL-2 AKA Protocol
CJL-2 AKA protocol is a modification of variation of Nalla and Reddy [18] . It provides perfect forward secrecy and PKG forward secrecy. 
C. CJL-3 AKA Protocol
CJL-3 AKA protocol is two-pass AKA protocol by modifying Smart's protocol [1] . It provides perfect forward secrecy and PKG forward secrecy. 
IV. CRYPTANALYSIS OF CHOIE.'S AKA PROTOCOLS
In this section, we show that all three protocols do not provide the known session-specific temporary information secrecy attribute. And also, CJL-2 AKA protocol is vulnerable against the key replicating attack,and CJL-3 AKA protocol is vulnerable against the key replicating attack with the forgery of the PKG's public key.
A. Known Session-Specific Temporary Information
Attack to CJL AKA Protocol Known session-specific temporary information secrecy attribute was firstly explored and discussed by Canetti and Krawczyk [11] . Later Cheng et al. [25] [26] [27] pointed out that the exposure of this private temporary information should not compromise the secrecy of generated session key. This important security attribute means that if the ephemeral secrets of a session are accidentally exposed to the adversary, the secrecy of the specific session key should not be compromised. The exposure of session-specific temporary information is reasonably not trivial as it may happen in some practical scenarios:
• The adversary might control, in advance, the (internal or external) random source of which the protocol participants are depending on in generating their random temporary secrets.
• The protocol participants may provide more protection to their crucial long-term secret key by storing it more securely than their session-specific internal states information. If the local states are not erased properly after a protocol run, there is a possibility where the adversary may hijack to the participants' machines in retrieving their internal states information.
To analyze the known session-specific temporary information attack to the three CJL AKA Protocols, we consider that both entities' temporary secrets a and b have been compromised by some means.
(1) For CJL-1 AKA protocol, with the knowledge of a and b , the adversary is able to retrieve the session key by computing 
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B. Key Replicating Attack on the CJL-2 AKA Protocol
We point out that CJL-2 AKA protocol is vulnerable to the key replicating attack. Key replicating attack is one form of the man-in-the-middle attacks. An active adversary can intercept and properly modify the messages exchanged between two parties, and force two parties to accept the same session key which is not the one that two parties really want to agree on. Key replicating attack destroys the key integrity. As Blake-Wilson, Johnson and Menezes [6] had correctly pointed out that, two-flow authenticated key agreement protocols that do not contain asymmetry in the formation of the session key will not meet the security requirements in the BR93 model. Illustration of an execution of the protocol in the presence of a malicious adversary E is as below (Fig.1): (1) A picks In the attack sequences showed above, both A and B have accepted the same session key. However, both A and B are non-partners since they do not have matching conversations. In addition, both A and B are uncorrupted since they have not been sent a Corrupt query. By sending a Reveal query to either A or B , the malicious adversary E is able to obtain the session key of a fresh oracle of a non-partner oracle.
C. Key Replicating Attack on the CJL-3 AKA Protocol
CJL-3 AKA protocol is also vulnerable to the key replicating attack with forgerable public key of the PKG. Firstly, the adversary E picks a random K kdf e Q P e Q P Q Q .
In the attack sequences showed above, both A and B have accepted the same session key. However, both A and B are non-partners since they do not have matching conversations. In addition, both A and B are uncorrupted since they have not been sent a Corrupt query. By sending a Reveal query to either A or B , the malicious adversary E is able to obtain the session key of a fresh oracle of a non-partner oracle.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we discuss the security issues of three authenticated key agreement protocols from pairing proposed by Choie et al. Our analysis shows that they all didn't provide protection against known session-key specific temporary information attack and some of them are vulnerable against man-in-the-middle attacks, such as the key replicating attack which destroy the integrity of agreed session keys. We analyze some of the attacks under the BR93 security model according to the defination of matching conversations and partnership.
With the development of provable secirity theory, some new security models [24] [28] were proposed with more powers given to the adversry. We would consider the security analysis of the proposed scheme and design the more secure scheme with stronger formal secuirty model.
